

C-o-p-y

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AGinder:bal (6 Nov 64)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director for Plans


SUBJECT: Reconsideration of CIA's Acceptance of  
JCS Wartime UW Requirements

REFERENCES: A. SR Memo, 25 August 1964, Same Subject  
B. EE Comments on Ref A, 10 Sept 1964,  
Same Subject  
C. SOD Comments on Ref A, 28 Sept 1964,  
Same Subject  
D. Memorandum for the Record, 1 October 1964  
Future of WUDEPOT

1. This memorandum submits a recommendation for your approval; this recommendation is contained in paragraph 2.

2. In view of the comments expressed in references above and particularly as a result of discussions with Chief, SR as indicated in reference D. It is recommended that the attached proposed memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff be forwarded to the DDCI for his approval and signature.

3. Request your approval of the above recommendations.

  
Chief, War Plans Staff

The recommendation in paragraph 2 is approved:

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Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

Attachment:  
As Stated

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 382B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

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AGinder:bal (6 Nov 64)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: Unconventional Warfare Requirements in Denied Areas

REFERENCE: Memo for Chairman, JCS, Subject: Report on CIA Capabilities to Meet CINCEUR's Revised Unconventional Warfare Requirements, dated 7 January 1963

1. This memorandum recommends action by the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence as stated in paragraph 4 below.
2. On 7 January 1963 the above referenced report containing CIA acceptances of USCINCEUR's Unconventional Warfare (UW) requirements was forwarded to the Chairman, JCS. All requirements for the USSR and a few of those for the Satellite countries were accepted against assets externally held in CONUS under the WUDEPOT Project.
3. Due to the very nature of the problems of operating in denied areas the feasibility of utilizing externally held assets to fulfill USEUCOM UW requirements for such areas has been a matter of much concern within the Clandestine Services. After eight years of experience with this program there has developed a number of very practical reasons why the CS now considers the use of externally held assets in CONUS to satisfy JCS requirements as unsound. Although their training is excellent and the program well conducted the teams are not, after a lapse of time, sufficiently current on conditions in the operations areas to do the job of effecting contact with either latent or active anti-regime elements.
4. It is therefore recommended that you sign the attached memorandum to the Chairman, JCS which reflects more realistically CIA's true capability for carrying out its wartime UW mission in the denied areas of USSR and Eastern Europe.

☐ ☐  
Chief, War Plans Staff

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Attachment:  
As Stated

Distribution:  
Orig & 1 - Addressee  
1 - DD/P  
1 - WPS/GLO  
1 - WPS Registry  
1 - EE  
1 - SR

COORDINATION:

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EE

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Date

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SR

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Date

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Change in CIA Acceptance of CINCEUR's  
Unconventional Requirements for USSR,  
Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland

REFERENCE: Memo for Chairman, JCS, Subject: Report  
on CIA Capabilities to Meet USCINCEUR's  
Revised Unconventional Warfare Requirements,  
dated 7 January 1963

1. Reference forwarded CIA's capabilities to fulfill CINCEUR's UW requirements to support planned wartime operations. Based on a recent thorough review of our current capabilities, it would be unrealistic for this Agency to continue to accept USCINCEUR's UW requirements for the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland.

2. In the past all requirements for the above countries have been accepted against assets externally held in the CONUS. With the passing of time, these assets have progressively lost their familiarity with persons and operating conditions within the projected target areas and will themselves now require internal contacts who can place them in touch with latent or active anti-regime elements if, in fact, such dissidence does exist. Thus, these assets no longer have the capability which is essential to the success of their mission.



3. To the degree possible, CIA internal assets which are targeted against current intelligence and covert action requirements will be used to satisfy USCINCEUR's requirements as the needs arises. We believe, however, that it would be highly impracticable to categorically accept UW requirements against such perishable assets. We are fairly confident that our intelligence collection activities in the above countries will provide a basis for locating dissident elements, when and if they appear, which may be useful to military forces.

4. Because of the many considerations involved in arriving at the above conclusions it is recommended that a joint meeting of CIA and JCS representatives be convened to re-examine and bring up to date the entire matter of concepts and criteria upon which the structure of UW requirements and capabilities are determined. Hopefully this will result in a more meaningful and mutually acceptable formula for the establishment of UW requirements.

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5. It is necessary at this time to revise previous UW acceptances to CINCEUR's requirements. Therefore, attached hereto are revised page changes to attachment forwarded by referenced memorandum which reflect CIA's current capabilities.

  
Lieutenant General, USA   
Deputy Director

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